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Why I Shop Online
Carl Ellison
23 November 2005
I’m a security architect by profession. As part of my career history, I wo= rked for the first online payment gateway company, CyberCash, and in that compan= y we were aware of all existing threats against online commerce and a bunch that haven’t materialized yet.
In the course of this experience, I devised a few observations and rules for myself and my friends about online shopping.
Cryptography is wonderful stuff. That’s what you’re usi= ng when you see the little closed padlock icon in the margin of your browser window.
=
I got into computer security through a passion for cryptography and I’m still passionate. When you have a chance to use cryptography, do it.
However, just seeing this padlock does not mean you are safe.
What this padlock means is that the information you pr= ovide (like a credit card number) can not be eavesdropped between your computer a= nd the server offering the web page. So, in the common shopping situation, you might define safety as mak= ing sure your credit card number isn’t misused by someone.
The cryptography here stops someone between your machi= ne and the web page server from seeing your credit card number, but:
So, with all that gloom and doom, why do I shop online= ?
I shop because the credit card companies protect me. They have to. When I hand my credit card to a wa=
iter
at a restaurant and he takes it into a back room, he could easily be making=
a
copy to sell to some attacker. This
doesn’t require online shopping to enable the attack. This attack has been possible for
decades – long before computer shopping was invented – and the
credit card companies have addressed it very well, at least from the
consumer’s point of view.
By national regulation in the
From a security geek’s point of view, the way th= ey protect me is with a two part protocol. The first part is handing over your card to the waiter, reading it over the phone to an telephone salesperson, writing it on a mail-in form or entering it on a web page. Those are all equivalent. This part has enough security to g= et the merchant to send you the thing you bought, but you aren’t out any mon= ey yet.
The second part of the protocol is when you get the statement from the credit card company.&nb= sp; It’s your job, now, to read over that statement and make sure = that every line item is something you actually did buy. If you find something you didnR= 17;t buy, you call the credit card company and reject the charge. That starts an investigative proce= ss and might result in reversal of charges. For the line items that you agree you bought, you then write a check= to the credit card company and mail it. This completes the second part of the protocol.
Because those two parts occur at different times and u= se information delivered by independent channels (the second part delivered by= the post office), it is very difficult for the attacker to intercept both parts= and subvert the whole protocol. B= ecause it ends with your writing a check, that piece of the process has its own security and that’s probably enough to block the attacker. That is, if the attacker could for= ge your checks, then that’s the most direct attack and there’s no reason to engage a credit card purchase.
Most debit cards look just like credit cards and they = act almost the same. There is a regulation limiting your liability in cases where the debit card number is stolen.
However, there is a major difference. When you buy with a debit card, the money comes out of your checking account immediately. There is no check-writing process.= When you get your statement, it sh= ows things already done.
So, if there is a charge you didn’t make on the statement, you can’t just refuse to include that in the check you wri= te. There is no check you write. Instead, you have to open a procedure with the bank to try to get reimbursed for this charge.
I have never tried that procedure, but I assume that u= ntil this is resolved, your account does not have the contested money in it. In that case, if the attacker drai= ned your account dry, you are doing all this process to get reimbursed while be= ing broke.
For this reason, even though the law protects me, I refuse to carry a debit card. I consider them too dangerous. I would certainly never use one for mail order, telephone order or w= eb shopping and strongly recommend that my friends not use them.
This is what I use to have my paycheck automatically deposited. It is what some merchants want me to use to pay for goods.
I absolutely refuse to pay for anything by electronic (direct) funds transfer!
As far as I know, there is no regulation limiting my l= oss if someone uses EFT to drain my bank account.= No one is responsible for reimbursing me. This makes EFT very desirable for a merchant. Once you have money= by EFT, you can count on it. It won’t be later challenged, as a credit c= ard payment can be. It won’= t be later withdrawn. But that same quality that makes this desirable for a merchant makes it completely unacceptable to me as the consumer. With EFT I am totally at the mercy of the merchant. Worse, I don’t know of any safeguards of my EFT information that would prevent an attacker from tapping into my account and draining it (in one transaction or in a series of transactions). Such safeguards might exist. If so, please se= nd them to cme@acm.org and I will modify th= is page.